Geopolitical Alignment
Whether the countries a supply chain depends on are willing to keep it working: through export rules, sanctions and agreements they still share. A product can be ready and paid for and still not move without permission. The world's most advanced chip-making machines are built in the Netherlands, and the newest ones need a Dutch export licence to leave; none of the most advanced kind has been shipped to China. The factory was ready; the permission was not.
Maturity
Where it feeds in
Where you have already met this
ASML builds its immersion scanners in the Netherlands. Since 1 September 2023, the most advanced ones need a Dutch export licence to leave. By January 2024 it had not shipped a single EUV machine to China. The factory was ready. The permission was not.
If this moved
If the major powers rebuilt shared rules - a working appeal stage at the WTO, binding limits on strategic weapons - seven megatrends held at 2 would lose a constraint. For four of them it is the only one: contested commons, multipolarity, middle-power agency and autonomous warfare. Digital sovereignty, critical minerals and reshoring would still be held by other enablers.
What to watch for
An appeal decided by a sitting WTO Appellate Body. Any new legally binding limit on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Not to be confused with
Deglobalisation. Trade volumes can hold up while the rules fragment. This enabler measures the rules and the willingness behind them, not the volume.
What it is
Whether the states a system depends on are willing to keep it working. It covers export controls, sanctions, standards blocs and the informal question of whose permission a supply chain implicitly requires.
How it works
- 01Find the chokepointA state looks for what others cannot replace: a lithography tool, a payment network, a design-software licence.
- 02Write the rule at homeExport controls, entity listings and sanctions are issued nationally, without a treaty. The US chip controls of October 2022 are the template.
- 03Reach abroadForeign-direct-product rules extend a control to goods made abroad with the controlling state's technology, so a factory in a third country has to comply.
- 04The target answersIt substitutes at home, reroutes trade, or controls something the other side needs - China's export ban on gallium and germanium to the US in December 2024 was that reply.
- 05Firms duplicateCompanies build separate supply chains for separate jurisdictions. Lost alignment is paid for in redundancy.
State of play
- The WTO Appellate Body has been unable to deliver binding rulings since December 2019, when the terms of two of its last three members expired and new appointments stayed blocked (European Commission, WTO dispute settlement; McCarthy Tétrault, 11 Dec 2019).
- New START expired on 5 February 2026, leaving no legally binding limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces (Arms Control Association, Mar 2026).
- World military spending reached $2,887 billion in 2025, the eleventh consecutive annual rise; Europe's grew 14% (SIPRI, 27 Apr 2026).
- The US imposed export controls on advanced computing chips and chipmaking equipment on 7 October 2022, widened them on 17 October 2023, and added foreign-direct-product rules in December 2024 (BIS; Federal Register 2024-28270, 5 Dec 2024).
- Sanctions designations against Russia rose from 2,695 before the February 2022 invasion to 26,655 by 15 August 2025 (Castellum.AI, 15 Aug 2025 - INDUSTRY-BELIEF).
- Trade routed through Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan replaced only about 5% of the fall in direct Western exports of sanctioned goods to Russia, on data to August 2022 (EBRD, 24 Feb 2023).
Why it matters
It sets the gradient by determining which capabilities are reliably available rather than merely purchasable. A chokepoint does not have to be used to have an effect: the credible possibility of its use changes what states and firms are willing to build on. This is the enabler that turned dependency from a procurement question into a security question, and it did so faster than any technical variable in the book.
- It sits at the minimum of seven megatrends, and for four of them it is the only enabler there.
- It turned dependency from a procurement question into a security question. A chokepoint does not have to be used to change what firms are willing to build on.
- It runs on a government clock, and the clock is running backwards: treaties expiring, an appeal court with no judges, military budgets up eleven years in a row.
What holds it back
Strategic distrust
The US, China and Russia treat interdependence as leverage. Rules that need all three to agree do not get made.
Blocked institutions
The WTO's appeal stage needs appointments that have been blocked since 2019. The interim appeal arrangement covers only the members who signed up to it.
Domestic politics
Export controls and sanctions are cheap to announce and popular at home. Lifting them is neither.
Terms
- Weaponised interdependence
- Using a central position in a global network - payments, chips, cables - to watch or squeeze the states that depend on it.
- Foreign direct product rule
- A US export rule that covers goods made abroad if they are the direct product of specified US technology or software.
- Entity List
- The US Commerce Department's list of foreign firms and people that need a licence to receive US-controlled items.
- Secondary sanctions
- Penalties on third-country firms for dealing with a sanctioned state or company.
- MPIA
- The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement: a stand-in for the WTO's appeal stage, used only by the members who joined it.
Steepens
| Megatrend | Weight | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Digital Sovereignty | large | shared weakest link (with 3 others) |
| Contested Commons and Chokepoints | large | shared weakest link (with 1 other) |
| Critical Mineral and Resource Scarcity | large | shared weakest link (with 3 others) Refining concentration is a political fact before it is a geological one. Substitution and recycling are advancing; alignment is not. |
| Distributed and Reshored Manufacturing | large | shared weakest link (with 6 others) |
| Multipolarity and the New World Order | large | weakest link |
| Middle-Power Agency and Non-Alignment 2.0 | moderate | weakest link |
| Autonomous and Asymmetric Warfare | moderate | shared weakest link (with 1 other) |
| Financialisation | moderate |
The gradient behaves like a sticky rubber band: it is pulled hardest toward the weakest enabler. Marginal links are shown but do not pull.
If this moved one step
Computed from the map as it stands: this score raised from 2 to 3, every other score unchanged. It is arithmetic, not a forecast.
Lifts the weakest link in
- Middle-Power Agency and Non-Alignment 2.02.6/5 , 3.4/5
- Multipolarity and the New World Order3.0/5 , 3.5/5
Tied as the weakest link
Here it shares the weakest spot with other enablers. Raising it alone leaves the weakest link where it is and lifts the gradient a little; the enablers it is tied with must move too.
- Autonomous and Asymmetric Warfare2.9/5 , 3.1/5tied with Public Procurement
- Contested Commons and Chokepoints3.1/5 , 3.3/5tied with Data Backup Embassy
- Critical Mineral and Resource Scarcity2.7/5 , 2.8/5tied with Materials Science, Permitting Speed, Recycling & Materials Recovery
- Digital Sovereignty2.9/5 , 3.0/5tied with Data Backup Embassy, Public Procurement, Central Bank Digital Currency
- Distributed and Reshored Manufacturing2.6/5 , 2.6/5tied with Construction Technology, Hydrogen, Managerial Capability, Materials Science, Permitting Speed, Recycling & Materials Recovery
The gradient also rises in
- Financialisation2.3/5 , 2.4/5
What would change the gradient
Conditional, not predictive. No dates, no probabilities.
- 01A second leading-edge capability cluster in a different jurisdiction - expensive, slow, and the only durable fix
- 02Plurilateral standards agreements that survive a change of government
- 03De-risking a specific layer rather than announcing sovereignty over the whole stack
Common misconception
That diversification solves it. Sovereignty is the depth of the shallowest layer, not the number of layers held - and a second supplier inside the same jurisdiction is not a second supplier. Holding one node of a chain while depending on the rest is owning the world's only key factory with no doors.
Talin, B. (2026). Geopolitical Alignment. The Future Explorer, dataset v0.4.0 (2026-11-16). https://explorer.talin.digital/e/geopolitical-alignment/