Energy Price
Energy Price & Availability
What a unit of electricity costs where the work happens, and whether a new factory, data centre or solar farm can be connected to the grid at all. Cheap power you cannot plug into is not cheap. In the US, power plants and batteries totalling about 2,000 gigawatts are waiting in line for a grid connection, and of projects that applied over two decades only about one in eight was ever built. The panels were cheap; the queue was not.
Maturity
Where it feeds in
Where you have already met this
At the end of 2025, 2,061 gigawatts of US power plants and batteries were waiting in line to connect to the grid. Of the capacity that had applied between 2000 and 2020, 13% was ever built. Three quarters gave up. The panels were cheap. The queue was not.
If this moved
If grid connection took months instead of years, reshored manufacturing and hyper-automation would lose a friction and still sit at 2 - held there by construction technology, geopolitics, materials science and managerial capability. The energy transition sits at 1 on consumption norms, and a shorter queue would not change that.
What to watch for
Total capacity in Berkeley Lab's annual Queued Up report - and whether it falls because projects connect or because they give up. Eurostat's half-yearly non-household electricity price and its tax share.
Not to be confused with
Levelised cost of electricity. That is what generating power costs at the plant. The price a factory pays adds the grid, balancing, taxes - and a connection it may wait years for.
What it is
What a unit of energy costs where the work has to happen, and whether it can be connected at all. Price and grid access are one enabler in practice: cheap power you cannot connect to is not cheap power.
How it works
- 01A plant generates powerSolar, wind, gas or nuclear plants produce electricity at their own terminals.
- 02Voltage is stepped upTransformers raise the voltage so the power can travel long distances with low losses.
- 03Operators balance the gridGrid operators match generation to demand second by second, and price congestion where lines are full.
- 04New connections wait in a queueEvery new plant or large load is studied for its effect on the grid before it may connect. This is where years are lost.
- 05Voltage is stepped down and billedLocal substations lower the voltage for customers, who pay for energy, for the network and for peak demand.
State of play
- US interconnection queues held 2,061 GW of proposed generation and storage at the end of 2025, 10% less than a year earlier, mainly because projects withdrew (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Queued Up: 2026 Edition, May 2026).
- Of the capacity that requested connection between 2000 and 2020, 13% was operating by the end of 2025 and 75% had withdrawn (LBNL, Queued Up: 2026 Edition, May 2026).
- For projects built in 2025, the median time from connection request to commercial operation was over five years (LBNL, Queued Up: 2026 Edition, May 2026).
- EU non-household consumers paid an average €0.1837 per kWh in the second half of 2025, excluding VAT and other recoverable taxes, down from €0.1941 a year earlier (Eurostat, Apr 2026).
- In the second half of 2025, prices ranged from €0.0748 per kWh in Finland to €0.2552 in Ireland, and non-recoverable taxes and levies were 17.7% of the EU average (Eurostat, Apr–May 2026).
- The average US retail electricity price for industrial customers was 8.13 cents per kWh in 2024 (EIA, Electric Power Annual 2024, Oct 2025).
Why it matters
It sets the gradient on everything physical, and increasingly on everything computational. It is also the enabler where the constraint has quietly moved: for large loads the binding factor in several markets is no longer generation cost but interconnection queue length. That distinction matters because the two have completely different fixes and only one of them is a technology.
- It feeds seven megatrends, including reshoring, digital sovereignty and the energy transition. It holds none of them today: each sits at 1 or 2 on something else.
- The constraint has moved from the power plant to the queue. Generation got cheaper. Connection did not get faster.
- Europe's industry pays a price set by grids and levies as much as by generation, and the spread inside the EU is more than threefold.
What holds it back
Interconnection studies
Every new plant or large load is studied for its effect on the grid, in turn. The median project built in 2025 took over five years from request to operation.
Transmission and substations
New lines and transformers need permits and heavy equipment. Cheap generation behind a full substation is still stranded.
Taxes, levies and network charges
In the EU, non-recoverable taxes and levies alone were 17.7% of the average non-household price in the second half of 2025.
Terms
- Interconnection queue
- The list of proposed power plants and large loads waiting for a grid operator to study and approve their connection.
- Interconnection agreement
- The signed contract that sets the terms and cost of connecting a project to the grid.
- Locational marginal price (LMP)
- The wholesale price of power at a specific point on the grid, including congestion and losses.
- Levelised cost of electricity (LCOE)
- A plant's lifetime generation cost divided by its lifetime output - the cost at the plant, not at the customer.
- Non-recoverable taxes
- Taxes and levies a business cannot reclaim, unlike VAT; Eurostat includes them in non-household prices.
Steepens
| Megatrend | Weight | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Automation of Cognitive Work | moderate | |
| Distributed and Reshored Manufacturing | large | Reshoring has capital, standards and automation available to it. In Europe it does not have competitive industrial power, and the ramp takes the minimum. |
| Energy Transition and Electrification | large | |
| Digital Sovereignty | large | |
| Water Security | moderate | |
| Circular Economy and Materials Substitution | moderate | |
| Hyper-automation of Industrial Production | moderate |
The gradient behaves like a sticky rubber band: it is pulled hardest toward the weakest enabler. Marginal links are shown but do not pull.
If this moved one step
Computed from the map as it stands: this score raised from 3 to 4, every other score unchanged. It is arithmetic, not a forecast.
Raised one step on its own, it lifts no megatrend's weakest link; each gradient it feeds still rises a little.
The gradient also rises in
- Automation of Cognitive Work2.7/5 , 2.7/5
- Circular Economy and Materials Substitution1.9/5 , 2.0/5
- Digital Sovereignty2.9/5 , 2.9/5
- Distributed and Reshored Manufacturing2.6/5 , 2.6/5
- Energy Transition and Electrification2.3/5 , 2.3/5
- Hyper-automation of Industrial Production2.8/5 , 2.8/5
- Water Security3.1/5 , 3.2/5
What would change the gradient
Conditional, not predictive. No dates, no probabilities.
- 01Interconnection queue reform - the single highest-leverage and least photogenic intervention available
- 02Storage and demand flexibility that let a load follow generation rather than requiring firm capacity
- 03Efficiency at the point of use, which has repeatedly resolved bottlenecks that were forecast as permanent
Common misconception
That data centres are the driver of demand growth. They are large and they are not civilisational: roughly 1.5% of global electricity in 2024. Electrification is the bigger driver, and saying so is not a defence of data centres. It is what the numbers show.
Talin, B. (2026). Energy Price & Availability. The Future Explorer, dataset v0.4.0 (2026-11-16). https://explorer.talin.digital/e/energy-price/